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Abstract. An important issue any organization or individual has to face when managing data con-
taining sensitive information, is the risk that can be incurred when releasing such data. Even though
data may be sanitized before being released, it is still possible for an adversary to reconstruct the
original data using additional information thus resulting in privacy violations. To date, however, a
systematic approach to quantify such risks is not available. In this paper we develop a framework,
based on statistical decision theory, that assesses the relationship between the disclosed data and the
resulting privacy risk. We model the problem of deciding which data to disclose, in terms of deciding
which disclosure rule to apply to a database. We assess the privacy risk by taking into account both
the entity identification and the sensitivity of the disclosed information. Furthermore, we prove that,
under some conditions, the estimated privacy risk is an upper bound on the true privacy risk. Finally,
we relate our framework with the k-anonymity disclosure method. The proposed framework makes
the assumptions behind k-anonymity explicit, quantifies them, and extends them in several natural
directions.
Keywords. Privacy, Security, Risk Management, Data Sharing, Decision Theory, Anonymity
1 Introduction
Data sharing has important advantages in terms of improved services and business, and
also for the society at large, such as in the case of homeland security. However, unautho-
rized data disclosures can lead to violations of individuals’ privacy, can result in financial
∗The work reported here has been supported by the NSF grants IPS-0712846 “Security Services for Health-
care Applications” and IPS-0712856 “Decision Theoretic Approaches to Measuring and Minimizing Customized
Privacy Risk”.
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and business damages as in the case of data pertaining to enterprises, or can result in threats
to national security as in the case of sensitive geospatial data.
Preserving the privacy of such data is a complex task driven by two important privacy
goals: (i) preventing the identification of the entity relating to the data, and (ii) prevent-
ing the disclosure of sensitive information. Entity identification occurs when the released
information makes it possible to identify the entity either directly (e.g., by publishing iden-
tifiers like SSNs), or indirectly (e.g., by linkage with other sources). Sensitive information
includes information that must be protected by law such as medical data, or is deemed
sensitive by the entity to whom the data pertains. In the latter case, data sensitivity is a
subjective measure whose nature may differ across entities.
In many cases, a careful evaluation needs to be carried out in order to assess whether
the privacy risk associated with the dissemination of certain data outweighs the benefits
of such dissemination. As pointed out in the recent guidelines issued by the [3], “Some
organizations have curtailed access without assessing the risk to security, the significance
of consequences associated with improper use of the data, or the public benefits for which
the data were originally made available. Contradictory decisions and actions by different
organizations easily negate each organization’s actions.” [21] introduces a way for provid-
ing privacy protection while constructing algorithms that learn information from disparate
data and introduces the notion of privacy-enhanced linking. [7] shows that it is impossible
to achieve privacy with respect to worst-case external knowledge.
To date, however, most of the work related to data privacy has focused on how to trans-
form the data so that no sensitive information is disclosed or linked to specific entities.
Because such techniques are based on data transformations that modify the original data
with the purpose of preserving privacy, the main focus of such approaches has been the
tradeoff between data privacy and data quality e.g., [18, 8]. Similar approaches based on
output perturbation have been proposed by [2] and [4].
An important practical requirement for any privacy solution is the ability to quantify the
privacy risk that can be incurred by the release of certain data. Even though data may
be sanitized, before being released, it is still possible for an adversary to reconstruct the
original data by using additional information that may be available, or by record linkage
techniques [26]. A possible adversarial scenario is depicted in Figure 1: an attacker exploits
data released by an organization by linking it with previously obtained data concerning the
same entity to gain an enhanced insight about this organization. Indeed, this insight would
help the attacker narrow down possible mismatches when it is compared against a public
dictionary, and consequently raising the identification risk. The goal of the work presented
in this paper is to develop, for the first time, a comprehensive framework for quantifying
such privacy risk and supporting informed disclosure policies.
The framework we propose is based on statistical decision theory and introduces the no-
tion of a disclosure rule that is a function representing the data disclosure policy. Our
framework estimates the privacy risk by taking into account a given disclosure rule and
possibly the knowledge that can be exploited by the attacker. It is important to point out
that our framework is able to assess privacy risks also when no information is available
concerning the knowledge or dictionary that the adversary may exploit. The privacy risk
function naturally incorporates both identity disclosure and sensitive information disclo-
sure. We introduce and analyze different shapes of the privacy risk function. Specifically,
we define the risk in the classical decision theory formulation and in the Bayesian formula-
tion, for either the linkage or the no-linkage scenario. We prove several interesting results
within our framework including that under reasonable hypotheses, the estimated privacy
risk is an upper bound on the true privacy risk. Finally, we gain insight by showing that the
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Figure 1: Adversarial framework for identity discovery
privacy risk is a quantitative framework for exploring the assumptions and consequences
of k-anonymity. The work presented in this paper was initially presented in the conference
paper [13].
2 Basics of Statistical Decision Theory
Statistical decision theory [24] offers a natural framework for measuring the quantitative
effect of information disclosure. As the necessary modifications of decision theory are rel-
atively minor, we are able to adapt a considerable array of tools and results from over 50
years of impressive research. We describe below only the principal concepts of this theory
in its traditional abstract setting, and then proceed to apply it to the information disclosure
problem.
Statistical decision theory deals with the abstract problem of making decisions in an un-
certain situation. Decisions, their properties and the resulting effect are specified formally,
enabling their quantitative and rigorous study. The uncertainty is encoded by a parameter
θ abstractly called “a state of nature” which is typically unknown. However, it is known
that θ belongs to a set Θ, usually a finite or infinite subset of Rl. The decisions are being
made based on a sample of observations (x1, . . . , xn), xi ∈ X and are represented via a
function δ : Xn → A where A is an abstract action space. The function δ is referred to as a
decision policy or decision rule.
A key element of statistical decision theory is that the state of nature θ governs the distri-
bution pθ(x) that generates the observed data (x1, . . . , xn). Given the state of nature θ, the
loss incurred by taking an action δ(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ A is determined by a non-negative loss
function
ℓ : A× Θ → [0, +∞] or ℓ(δ(x1, . . . , xn), θ) ≥ 0.
We sometime denote ℓ(δ(x1, . . . , xn), θ) as δθ(x1, . . . , xn) when we wish to emphasize it as
a function, parameterized by θ, of the observed data.
Rather than measuring the loss incurred by a specific decision rule and a specific set of
observations, it makes sense to consider the expected loss, or risk, where the expectation
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is taken over observations being generated from the distribution generating the data pθ.




p(x)h(x) dx continuous x∑
x∈X p(x)h(x) discrete x
the expected loss or risk associated with the decision rule δ and θ ∈ Θ is
R(δ, θ) = Epθ(x1,...,xn)(ℓ(δ(x1, . . . , xn), θ)) = E
Q
pθ(xi)(ℓ(δ(x1, . . . , xn), θ))
where the last equality assumes independence of x1, . . . , xn.
The two main statistical paradigms, classical statistics and Bayesian statistics, carry over
to decision theory. In the classical setting of decision theory, the risk R(δ, θ) is the main
quantity of interest and its properties and relations to different decision rules δ and states
θ are studied. The Bayesian approach to decision theory assumes that another piece of
information is available: our prior beliefs concerning the possibility of various states of
nature θ ∈ Θ. This prior belief is represented by a prior probability q(θ) over possible states
leading to the Bayes risk
R(δ) = Eq(θ)(R(δ, θ)) = Eq(θ){Epθ(x1,...,xn)(ℓ(δ(x1, . . . , xn), θ))}. (1)
Much has been said in the statistics literature over the controversy between the classical
and the Bayesian points of view. Without going into this discussion, we simply point out
that an advantage of the Bayes risk is that we can compare different policies δ1, δ2 based
on a single number - their associated risks R(δ1), R(δ2) leading to a partial order on all
possible policies. An advantage of the classical framework is that there is no need for a
prior distribution q - which is often hard or impossible to specify. In both cases, we need to
have a precise specification of the probabilistic model pθ(x), a set of possible states of nature
Θ and a loss function ℓ. While pθ and Θ depend on modeling assumptions or estimation
from data, the loss function ℓ is typically elicited from a user and its subjective quality
reflects the personalized nature of risk-based analysis and decision theory.
3 Privacy Risk Framework
As private information in databases is being disclosed, undesired effects occur such as
privacy violations, financial loss due to identity theft, and national security breaches. To
proceed with a quantitative formalism we assume that we obtain a numeric description,
referred to as loss, of that undesired effect. The loss may be viewed as a function of two ar-
guments (i) whether the disclosed information enables identification and (ii) the sensitivity
of the disclosed information.
The first argument of the loss function encapsulates whether the disclosed data can be tied
to a specific entity or not. Consider for example the case of a hospital disclosing a list of
patients’ gender and whether they have a certain medical condition or not. Due to the pres-
ence of medical information, such data is clearly sensitive. However, the data sensitivity
does not provide any information about the chance of tying the disclosed data to specific
individuals and as a result the patients maintain their anonymity and no harmful effect
is produced. The clear distinction between data sensitivity and identification, and their
combination via a probabilistic framework, is a central part of our framework. The quan-
tification of the identification probability depends on (i) the disclosed data, (ii) available
side information such as national archives or a phone-book, and (iii) an attacker model.
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In contrast to the identification probability, the second argument of the loss function con-
cerning the data sensitivity depends on the entity associated with the data. Data such as
annual income, medical history, and Internet purchases relating to specific users may be
very sensitive to some but only marginally sensitive to others. Such personalized or cus-
tomized sensitivity measures are important to be taken into consideration when measuring
harmful effects and deciding on a disclosure policy. Clearly, ignoring it may lead to offering
insufficient protection to a subset of people while applying excessive protection to the pri-
vacy of another subset. It is worth pointing out that we do not draw a distinction between
sensitive attributes and quasi-identifiers [15, 27, 14]. Rather, our framework provides more
flexibility by enabling the owners of the data to supply the sensitivity of their attributes at
their discretion.
We assume that the data resides in a relational database with the relational scheme (A1, . . . ,
Am), where each attribute Ai takes values in a domain Domi which includes a possible
missing value symbol ⊥. The space
X = Dom1 × Dom2 × · · · × Domm
represents the set of all possible records, both original records residing in a database and
disclosed records. We make the following assumptions for the sake of notational simplicity,
none of which are crucial to the presented framework. First, we assume that one of the
attributes A1 uniquely identifies the entity associated with the record. This attribute will
typically not be disclosed, but is important for notational convenience. Second, we assume
that the symbol ⊥ ∈ Domi for all i, corresponds to both a missing value in the database
and to attribute values that are suppressed during the disclosure procedure. Suppression
of the (non-missing) j-attribute in a record y ∈ X may thus be represented by a function
δ : X → X for which [δ(y)]j = ⊥. Finally, we assume that the space X is sufficiently rich to
denote attribute generalizations, for example
North America ∈ Domcountry
represents a generalization of the country attribute to a more vague concept.
We will usually refer to an arbitrary record as x, y or z and to a specific record in a par-
ticular database using a subscript xi (note the bold-italic typesetting representing vector
notation). The attribute values of records are represented using the notation [x]j , [xi]j or
just xj or xij , respectively (note the non-bold typesetting). A collection of n records, for
example a database containing n records, is represented by (x1, . . . , xn) ⊆ Xn.
3.1 Disclosure Rules and Privacy Risk
Adapting the decision theory framework described in the previous section to privacy re-
quires relatively a few changes. Instead of decision policies δ : Xn → A we have disclosure
policies δ : X → X representing disclosing the data as is (e.g., δ(z) = z), attribute suppres-
sion (e.g., [δ(z)]j = ⊥), or attribute generalization (e.g., [δ(z)]j = North America).
The state of nature θ that influences the incurred loss ℓθ = ℓ(·, θ) is the side information
used by the attackers in their identification attempt. Such side information θ is often a
public data resource composed of identities and their attributes, for example a phone-book.
The record distribution p is the distribution that generates the disclosed data where we omit
the dependence on θ since in our case p is independent of the attacker’s side information
θ. In the case of disclosing a specific set of records x1, . . . , xn that are known in advance, a
convenient choice for p is the empirical distribution p̃ over these records, defined below.
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Statistical decision theory Privacy risk framework
X Space of abstract data Space of disclosed or stored records
x1, . . . , xn Available observations Records to be (partially) disclosed;
sampled from pθtrue determine p̃(x)
θ ∈ Θ Determines the data distribution pθ(x) Side information; unrelated to data
δ Determines abstract action Determines what to disclose
based on x1, . . . , xn from a single record xi
ℓ Abstract loss; based on x1, . . . , xn Privacy loss incurred from disclosing δ(xi)
and the model θ in the presence of the side information θ
R(δ, θ) Abstract risk associated with decision Privacy risk associated with disclosure rule
rule δ and the model θ and side information θ
R(δ) Bayes risk associated with decision rule δ Bayes risk associated with disclosure rule δ
Figure 2: Similarities and differences between statistical decision theory and the privacy
framework








where 1{z=xi} is 1 if z = xi and 0 otherwise.










i=1 ℓθ(xi). Taking expectation with respect to distributions other
than p̃ can lead to a weighted average of losses, representing a situation in which some
records are more important than others (although this effect can be more naturally incor-
porated into ℓ as described in the Section 3.3). More generally, in case of a streaming or
sequential disclosure of records generated from a particular distribution p, we should com-
pute the expected loss over that distribution in order to obtain a privacy risk relevant to the
situation at hand.
The following definitions complete the adaptation of statistical decision theory to the pri-
vacy risk setting. The similarities and differences between these definitions and their coun-
terparts of the previous section are summarized in Figure 2.
Definition 2. The loss function ℓ : X ×Θ → [0, +∞] measures the loss incurred by disclos-
ing the data δ(z) ∈ X due to possible identification based on the side information θ ∈ Θ.
Definition 3. The risk of the disclosure rule δ in the presence of side information θ is the
expected loss R(δ, θ) = Ep(z)(ℓ(δ(z), θ)).
Definition 4. The Bayes risk of the disclosure rule δ is R(δ) = Eq(θ)(R(δ, θ)) where q(θ) is
a prior probability distribution on Θ.
3.2 Identification Probabilities, Data Sensitivity, and Loss Functions
We turn at this point to consider in detail the process of identifying the entity represented
by the disclosed record, the data sensitivity, and their relation to the loss function. The
identification attempt is normally carried out by the attacker who uses the disclosed record
y = δ(x) and additional side information (or dictionary θ) whose role is to tie the disclosed
data to a list of possible candidate identities.
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The specification of the loss function ℓ is typically entity and problem dependent. We
can, however, make significant progress by decomposing the loss into two parts: (i) the at-
tacker’s probability of identifying the data owner based on the disclosed data δ(x) and side
information θ, and (ii) the user-specified data sensitivity. While the data sensitivity is a sub-
jective measure specified by users, the attacker’s probability of identifying the data owner
should be computed based on the side information θ and a probabilistic attacker model.
We proceed below with describing a reasonable derivation of the attacker’s identification
probability and then proceed with a description of the user-specified data sensitivity func-
tion.
Given a disclosed record δ(x), and available side information or dictionary θ, the at-
tacker can narrow down the list of possible identities to the subset of entity entries in
θ that are consistent with the disclosed attributes δ(x). For example, consider x being
(first-name, surname, phone-number) and the dictionary θ being a phone-book.
The attacker needs only to consider dictionary entities that are consistent with the disclosed
record δ(x). If there are no missing values and the entire record is disclosed, i.e. δ(x) = x, it
is likely that only one entity exists in the dictionary that is consistent with the disclosed in-
formation. On the other hand, if the attribute value for phone-number is suppressed, the
phone-book θ may yield more than a single consistent entity, depending on the popularity
of the combination (first-name, surname).
Formalizing the above idea we define the binary random variable Z which equals 1 if the
attacker successfully identified the data owner and 0 otherwise. The identification proba-
bility p(Z = 1) depends on the attacker, but in the absence of additional information we
may assume that the identification attempt is a uniform selection from the set of entities in
θ consistent with the disclosed δ(x), denoted by ρ(δ(x), θ),
p(Z = 1) =
{
|ρ(δ(x), θ)|−1 if ρ(δ(x), θ) 6= ∅
0 if ρ(δ(x), θ) = ∅
and
p(Z = 0) = 1 − p(Z = 1).
The data sensitivity is determined by two user specified functions Φ, Ψ : X → [0, +∞].
Φ measures the harmful effect of disclosing the data assuming that the attacker’s identifi-
cation is successful, i.e., Φ(x) is ℓ(δ(x), θ) provided that {Z = 1}. Similarly, Ψ measures
the harmful effect of disclosing the data assuming that the attacker’s identification was
unsuccessful, i.e., Ψ(x) is ℓ(δ(x), θ) provided that {Z = 0}.
Putting the identification probability and sensitivity function together, we have that the
harmful effect is a random variable with two possible outcomes: Φ(δ(x)) with probability
p(Z = 1) and Ψ(δ(x)) with probability p(Z = 0). Accounting for the uncertainty resulting
from possible identification we define the loss ℓ(y, θ) as the expectation
ℓ(δ(x), θ) = p(Z = 1) · Φ(δ(x)) + p(Z = 0)Ψ(δ(x)).
Allowing Φ, Ψ to take on the value +∞ enables us to model situations where the data
sensitivity is so high that its disclosure is categorically prohibited (if Ψ(δ(x)) = +∞) or is
prohibited under any positive identification chance (if Φ(δ(x)) = +∞).
It is often the case that no harmful effect is caused if the attacker’s identification attempt
fails leading to Ψ ≡ 0. For simplicity, we assume this is the case in the remainder of the pa-
per, leading to ℓ(δ(x), θ) = p(Z = 1)Φ(δ(x)). The risk R(δ, θ) with respect to the empirical
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distribution p̃ over the disclosed records is




i : ρ(δ(xi),θ) 6=∅
Φ(δ(xi))
|ρ(δ(xi), θ)|
and the Bayes risk under the prior q(θ) is












or its discrete equivalent if Θ is a discrete space. Similar expressions can be computed if
the assumption Ψ ≡ 0 is relaxed.
As mentioned above, the concepts defined in this section are somewhat different from
the traditional use of decision theory. The parameter θ describes the attacker’s knowledge
rather than a parameter governing the data generation process. We believe this is appropri-
ate as it represents an unknown state of nature that we wish to protect from, e.g., minimax
risk with respect to θ corresponds to a worst case scenario. We also typically use the em-
pirical distribution when computing expectations, rather than a full probabilistic model.
However, if a full probabilistic model exists, it may replace the empirical distribution. This
interpretation of decision theory in the context of privacy is different from [22], [23] (see re-
lated work section) which assume a more traditional setting including a prior and posterior
belief functions, both of which are focused on inferring the state of nature θ. We believe,
however, that our approach is more appropriate to our problem, which is measuring per-
sonalized utility and risk associated with disclosing private information.
Returning to our example of data being phone-book entries, we have that p(Z = 1) is the
probability that a disclosed data (potentially suppressed or generalized) may be mapped
to a specific individual, assuming identification is done by random selection. The loss
ℓ(δ(x), θ) is the expected sensitivity of the disclosed information times the identification
probability. The risk measures the expected sensitivity of the disclosed information in the
long run, as repeated trials and identification attempts are made.
3.3 Parametric Families of Sensitivity Functions
We now present several possible families of expressions for the data sensitivity function
Φ. Since Φ is defined on the set X of all possible records, defining it by a lookup table is
impractical for a large number of attributes. We therefore consider several options leading
to compact and efficient representations. Given a disclosed record y = δ(x), perhaps the
simplest meaningful form for Φ is a linear combination of non-negative weights wj ≥ 0
over the disclosed attributes
Φ1(y) =
∑
j : yj 6=⊥
wj (2)
where wj represents the sensitivity associated with the corresponding attribute Aj . A
weight of +∞ represents critically sensitive information that may only be disclosed if there
is zero chance of it leading to identification.
In some cases, the data sensitivity significantly depends on the entity associated with the
record. In other words attributes Ai may be highly sensitive for some records and less so
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for other records. Recalling the assumption that one of the attributes, say y1, represents a





The weights {wj,r : j = 1, . . . , n} should be elicited from the different entities correspond-
ing to the records or otherwise assigned by the database according to the group or cluster








can be enforced to provide all entities with similar privacy protection, or to make sure that
no single entity dominates the privacy risk.
There are a number of ways to increase the flexibility of sensitivity functions beyond linear
forms. One way to do so is by forming linear expressions containing k-order interaction










Expressions containing k-order interaction terms use additional weights to capture inter-
actions of at most k attributes that are not accounted for in the expressions (2) and (3). As
k increases in magnitude, the class of functions represented by Φ becomes richer and, in
the case of k = m, provides arbitrary flexibility. However, increasing k beyond a certain
limit is impractical as both the number of weights specified by the users as well as the
computational complexity associated with Φ4 grow exponentially with k.












in which case increasing one weight wi,j while fixing the others causes the sensitivity to
increase exponentially in contrast to (2)-(4). The precise choice of the sensitivity function Φ
(or Ψ) ultimately depends on the database policy and entities relating to the data. A simple
expression such as (3) or (5) has the advantage of being easier to elicit and interpret.
In some cases the elicitation of the sensitivity function may not be easy. It is similar to
eliciting prior from an expert in Bayesian statistics. However, it is necessary in order to
provide some degree of customization which is important in privacy applications.
We also note that the sensitivity may be defined with respect to the the user target rather
than the entity disclosing the data. The two entities may have different sensitivities and
choosing one over the other depends on the context of the problem and whose risk we
are really trying to minimize. The framework presented here applies with no modification
regardless of whose sensitivity we are actually measuring or whose risk we are minimizing.
3.4 Data Suppression and Generalization and the Privacy Risk
A common practice in privacy preservation is to replace data records with suppressed or
more general values [18, 19] in order to ensure anonymity and prevent the disclosure of
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Figure 3: A partial value generalization hierarchy (VGH) for the address field
sensitive data. A disclosure policy δ : X → X can suppress an attribute by assigning a ⊥
symbol to the appropriate attribute i.e. [δ(x)]j = ⊥.
Assuming that the space X is rich enough to contain the necessary generalizations, at-
tribute value generalization may be accomplished by assigning a disclosed value that is
more general than the original attribute value xj ≺ [δ(x)]j . Formally, we assume that Domi
is a partially ordered set (Si,≺) whose smallest elements correspond to non-generalized at-
tribute values and whose single maximum element is the ultimate generalized value, which
we identify with the suppressed or missing value introduced earlier, ⊥.
The partially ordered set Domi may be illustrated using its Hasse diagram in which every
node correspond to a member of Domi and the edges correspond to the covering relation:
x covers y if y ≺ x and ∄z : y ≺ z ≺ x [20]. Furthermore when drawing the Hasse diagram
we draw more general nodes vertically higher than less general nodes. As an example, con-
sider the attribute value representing a location or address and several levels of generalized
values. A partial Hasse diagram representing the partial value generalization hierarchy for
this attribute is illustrated in Figure 3. In this particular case, the Hasse diagram is rela-
tively simple and is graphically described using a tree structure. More general examples
and properties of partially ordered set may be found in [20].
Replacing an attribute value xj by a more general value x̂j , i.e. xj ≺ x̂j , increases the set
of entities consistent with that value in the attacker’s dictionary θ, i.e.
xj  x̂j =⇒ ρ((x1, . . . , xj , . . . , xm), θ) ⊆ ρ((x1, . . . , x̂j , . . . , xm), θ) (6)
where ρ(x, θ) is the set of entities in θ consistent with x. Equation (6) indicates that as
expected, generalizing an attribute value (which includes suppression as a special case)
reduces the identification probability p(Z = 1).
Equation (6) together with the assumption that the data sensitivity function Φ assigns
smaller values to more general data ensures that the loss ℓ(δ(x), θ) decreases with the
amount of data generalization. The precise constraint on Φ depends on its parametric form
such as expressions (2)-(5). For example, in the case of a personalized linear sensitivity (3),
the appropriate constraints on the weights are
1. wa ≥ 0
2. wa,r ≤ wb,r ∀a  b ∀r.
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3. w⊥ = 0.
The last constraint above is not crucial, but it ensures that fully suppressed data have zero
sensitivity Φ(⊥, . . . ,⊥) = 0.
In summary, as we generalize or suppress data both the identification probability p(Z = 1)
and data sensitivity Φ(δ(x)) decrease leading to lower loss ℓ(δ(x, θ)) and lower risk R(δ, θ).
Considering the disclosure risk R(δ, θ) by itself leads to the conclusion that in order to min-
imize the risk the data needs to be completely suppressed or generalized. However, such
a conclusion misses the point since it ignores the benefit obtained from the data disclosure.
In order to appropriately appreciate the trade-off between the risk and benefit associated
with private data disclosure we extend our discussion in the next section to include a quan-
tification of the benefit associated with data disclosure.
4 The Optimal Disclosure Policies
Apart from incurring a privacy risk, disclosing private data δ(x) has some benefit, or else
data would never be disclosed. We represent this benefit by a utility function u : X → R+
whose expectation
U(δ) = Ep(x)(u(δ(x)))
plays a similar but opposing role to the risk R(δ, θ). While the loss ℓ(δ(x), θ) may change
from user to user, the utility is typically specified by the disclosing organization or the data
recipient and is not user dependent.
The relationship between the risk and expected utility is schematically depicted in Figure 4
which displays disclosure policies δ on a 2-D plane using the corresponding risk R and
expected utility U as coordinates (R, U). The shaded region in the figure corresponds to the
set of achievable disclosure policies, i.e., every coordinate (R, U) in that region corresponds
to one or more policies δ realizing it. The unshaded region corresponds to un-achievable
policies, i.e., there does not exist any δ with the corresponding risk and expected utility.
The vertical line in the figure corresponds to all rules whose risk is fixed at a certain level.
Similarly, the horizontal line corresponds to all rules whose expected utility is fixed at a
certain level. Since the disclosure goal is to obtain both low risk and high expected utility,
we are naturally most interested in disclosure policies occupying the boundary or frontier
of the shaded region. Policies in the interior of the shaded region can be improved upon by
projecting them to the boundary.
The vertical and horizontal lines suggest the following two ways of resolving the risk-
utility tradeoff. Assuming that we cannot afford incurring risk higher than some acceptable
level, we can define the optimal policy as
δ∗ = argmax
δ
U(δ) subject to R(δ, θ) ≤ c. (7)
Alternatively, insisting on having expected utility no less than a certain acceptable level,
we can define the optimal policy as
δ∗ = argmin
δ
R(δ, θ) subject to U(δ) ≥ c. (8)
A more symmetric definition of optimality is given by
δ∗ = arg min
δ
R(δ, θ) − λU(δ) (9)
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U(δ)
R(δ, θ)
Figure 4: Space of disclosure rules and their risk and expected utility. The shaded region
correspond to all achievable disclosure policies δ.
where λ ∈ R+ is a parameter controlling the relative importance of minimizing risk and
maximizing utility.
The formation and interpretation of optimality depend on the situation at hand and are
ultimately up to policy makers. We focus below on the case (8), but to simplify the notation
we denote ∆ = {δ : U(δ) ≥ c} so that (8) becomes δ∗ = arg minδ∈∆ R(δ, θ). Solving (8)
may often be computationally challenging as it is not easy to get a closed form definition of
the constraint set ∆ = {δ : U(δ) ≥ c}. More efficient computational search can usually be
obtained by considering instead δ∗ = arg minδ∈b∆ R(δ) where ∆̂ = {δ : ∀i, u(δ(xi)) ≥ c} ⊆
∆.
Solving the optimization problems (7)-(9) requires knowledge of the attacker’s side infor-
mation θ. Indeed, in some cases the attacker’s side information is known - for example
when θ constitutes national archives or some other publicly available dataset. In cases
where the attacker’s side information θ is unknown we can proceed instead using one of
the following approaches.
Bayes Risk Replacing R(δ, θ) in (7)-(9) with the Bayes risk R(δ) = Eq(θ)(R(δ, θ)) provides
Bayesian-optimal policies that are independent of θ .
Estimating θ In some cases we can obtain an estimate of the attacker’s side information θ̂.
In these cases we can use expressions (7)-(9) with R(δ, θ) replaced by R(δ, θ̂). Math-
ematical analysis can be used to study the quality of the approximation R(δ, θ̂) ≈
R(δ, θ) in terms of the approximation θ̂ ≈ θ.
Worst Case Scenario In the absence of any information concerning θ we can use (7)-(9)
with the worst case risk maxθ∈Θ R(δ, θ) instead of R(δ, θ). The resulting policies, for
example the minimax risk δ∗ = arg minδ∈∆ maxθ∈Θ R(δ, θ), have the best worst case
scenario.
Bounding the Risk This approach is described in the next section.
4.1 Bounding the True Risk by the Estimated Risk
In some of the cases where the attacker’s side information θtrue is unknown, we can use a
more specific side information θ̂, for example the relational database itself, to upper-bound
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the true risk R(δ, θtrue) by the risk R(δ, θ̂). The relation between the attacker’s side infor-
mation θtrue and the more generic version θ̂ is formally defined in Definition 5. Intuitively
the relation indicates that all entries in θ̂ may be found in θtrue where they may appear with
less, or more general, attribute values.
Definition 5. We define a partial order relation ≪ between dictionaries θ = (θ1, . . . , θl1)
and η = (η1, . . . , ηl2) by saying that θ ≪ η if for every θi, ∃ηj such that ηj1 = θi1 and
∀k θik  ηjk .
Above, we considered dictionaries θ = (θ1, . . . , θl) as relational tables, where θi = (θi1, . . . ,
θiq) is a record of a relation Tθ(A1, . . . , Aq), with A1 corresponding to the record identifier.
It is often the case that the situation described above holds with θ̂ representing proprietary
or organizational database unknown to the attacker and the attacker’s θtrue corresponding
to a public resource such as a phone-book or some other generic listing. Since θtrue is a more
general purpose listing than θ̂ it has records corresponding to all records in θ̂. Furthermore,
since θ̂ is more specific than the general purpose listing θtrue the entries in θ̂ will be more
specific and will have less missing values than θtrue. The motivation for considering a more
specific (but known) θ̂ instead of the unknown θtrue is that it leads to the following upper
bound of the privacy risk.
Proposition 1. If θ̂ contains records that correspond to x1, . . . , xn and θ̂ ≪ θtrue, then
∀δ R(δ, θtrue) ≤ R(δ, θ̂).
Proof. For every disclosed record δ(xi) there exists a record in θ̂ that corresponds to it and
since θ̂ ≪ θtrue there is also a record in θtrue that corresponds to it. As a result, ρ(δ(xi), θ̂)
and ρ(δ(xi), θ
true) are non-empty sets.
For an arbitrary a ∈ ρ(δ(xi), θ̂) we have a = θ̂v for some v and since θ̂ ≪ θtrue there
exists a corresponding record θtruek . The record θ
true
k will have the same (or more) general
values as a and therefore θtruek ∈ ρ(δ(xi), θ
true). The same argument can be repeated for
every a ∈ ρ(δ(xi), θ̂) thus showing that ρ(δ(xi), θ̂) ⊆ ρ(δ(xi), θtrue) or |ρ(δ(xi), θtrue)|−1 ≤
|ρ(δ(xi), θ̂)|−1.
The probability of identifying δ(xi) by the attacker is thus smaller than the identification
probability based on θ̂ and it follows that
∀i ℓ(δ(xi), θ
true) ≤ ℓ(δ(xi), θ̂) ⇒ R(δ, θ
true) ≤ R(δ, θ̂).
4.2 Independence and Integrity Constraints
Computing and minimizing the risk may be computationally demanding in the general
case. In this section we discuss how the independence assumption or its relaxation by
introducing integrity constraints affects such computational efficiency considerations. Sec-
tion 8 describes using branch and bound, a discrete approximations method, in order to
further accelerate the computation and minimization of the privacy risk.
The assumption that different attributes are statistically independent is somewhat ques-
tionable but still often used in high dimensions due to its practicality. For instance, return-
ing to the simple phone-book example, the independence assumption may imply that the
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popularity of first names does not depend on the popularity of last names, e.g.,
p(first-name = Mary|surname = Smith) = p(first-name = Mary|surname = Johnson)
= p(first-name = Mary).
Clearly, some attributes are strongly correlated while others are generally believed to be
independent. The introduction of integrity constraints to model correlated attributes (e.g.,
{profession = A} ⇒ {salary ∈ C}) while assuming independence between uncorrelated
attributes is an effective relaxation of the complete independence assumption. We first
discuss the implication of complete independence to risk computation and then proceed to
consider the presence of integrity constraints.
Under the assumption of statistical independence on the attribute values the identification












for some appropriate functions αj . As a result the loss function (assuming a parametric


































where C1(y) = {j : j > 1, yj = ⊥} and C2(y) = {j : j > 1, yj 6= ⊥}.
To select the disclosure of k attributes that minimizes the above loss, it remains to select




}mj=2 which may be efficiently computed in time O(nNm) where
n, N, m are the number of disclosed records, dictionary size, and number of attributes,
respectively.
Extensions of the above decomposition are straightforward when the attributes can be
divided to several clusters satisfying statistical dependence for attributes within the same
cluster and statistical independence for attributes belonging to different clusters. An al-
ternative decomposition for more general integrity constraints or statistical dependencies
may be obtained through the product factorization of graphical models in statistics, e.g.,
[25].
5 Privacy Risk and k-Anonymity
k-Anonymity [18] has recently received considerable attention by the research community
[29, 1]. Given a relation T , k-anonymity ensures that each disclosed record can be indis-
tinctly matched to at least k individuals in T . It is enforced by considering a subset of the
attributes called quasi-identifiers, and forcing the disclosed values of these attributes to ap-
pear at least k times in the database. k-Anonymity uses two operators to accomplish this
task: suppression and generalization.
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In its original formulation, k-anonymity does not seem to make any assumptions on the
possible external knowledge that could be used for entity identification and does not re-
fer to a privacy loss. However, a closed examination reveals that k-anonymity implicitly
makes strong assumptions whose presence may undermine its original motivation. Follow-
ing the formal presentation of k-anonymity in the privacy risk context, we analyze these
assumptions and their possible relaxations.
Since the k-anonymity requirement is enforced on the relation T (the database containing
the original records) the anonymization algorithm considers the attacker’s side information
θtrue as equal to the database T . Representing the k-anonymity rule by δ∗k we have that the
following expression of k-anonymity constraints
∀i |ρ(δ∗k(xi), T )| ≥ k. (10)
Since k-anonymity is concerned only with satisfying the constraints (10) and ignores the
role of the data sensitivity we consider its sensitivity function to be constant Φ ≡ c.
As a result, the loss incurred by k-anonymity δ∗k is bounded by ℓ(δ
∗
k(xi), T ) ≤ c/k where
equality is achieved if the constraint |ρ(δ∗k(xi), T )| = k is met. On the other hand, any rule
δ0 that violates the k-anonymity requirement for some xi will incur a loss higher (under
θ = T and Φ ≡ c) than the k-anonymity rule
ℓ(δ0(xi), T ) =
c
|ρ(δ0(xi), T )|
≥ ℓ(δ∗k(xi), T ).
We thus have the following result presenting k-anonymity as an optimal risk minimizer
policy.
Proposition 2. Let δ∗k be a k-anonymity rule and δ0 be a rule that violates the k-anonymity
constraint, both with respect to xi ∈ T . Then
ℓ(δ∗k(xi), T ) ≤ c/k < ℓ(δ0(xi), T ).
As the above proposition implies, a k-anonymity rule minimizes the privacy loss per ex-
ample xi and may be seen as argminδ∈∆ R(δ, T ) where ∆ is a set of rules that includes both
k-anonymity rules and rules that violate the k-anonymity constraints. Viewed as a privacy
risk minimizer, we can examine the now explicit assumptions behind k-anonymity:
1. θtrue = T ,
2. Φ ≡ c, and
3. ∆ is under-specified.
The first assumption may be taken as an indication that k-anonymity simply assumes that
the database relation T is available as side information to the attacker. This assumption can
be expanded as described earlier by assuming an estimated θ̂, using a Bayesian averaging,
worst case risk maxθ∈Θ R(δ, θ) or that θ
true is a publicly available resource. Such adaptation
of k-anonymity are likely to more faithfully protect privacy and yet should not require a
major conceptual change to the k-anonymity framework.
The second assumption of the sensitivity function Φ ≡ c being constant is a result of
k-anonymity’s singular attention to protection from identification. In other words, disclos-
ing data incurs the same loss regardless of the data itself and the entity to whom the data
pertains, as long as there exists a certain protection from identification. This is a prob-
lematic assumption since under imperfect identification protection, the notion of privacy
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preservation is not synonymous with identification. In cases where a positive probability
of identification exists, the nature of the disclosed data and in particular its sensitivity with
respect to the the entity it relates to should play a crucial role.
As a simple example, consider facing two possible disclosure options: the disclosure of
data containing a substantial medical diagnosis (e.g., HIV positive) and the disclosure of
data containing a recent grocery shopping transaction. Intuitively, disclosing the first data
would lead to a greater privacy violation than the second data under non-zero identifica-
tion probability. However k-anonymity, assuming a constant sensitivity function, considers
the disclosure of both data equally harmful if they provide similar identification protection.
Furthermore, it may favor the disclosure of very sensitive data over non-sensitive data as
long as it provides a slightly better identification protection.
Section 8 presents a case study illustrating this point further in the context of a commer-
cial organization’s customer transaction database. For a diverse commercial organization,
transactions should be classified according to varying sensitivity levels. k-Anonymity pro-
tection would exert undesired privacy protection in some areas while lacking in other ar-
eas. The privacy risk framework presented in this paper provides a natural extension to
k-anonymity by making Φ non-constant. The resulting privacy loss combines data sensi-
tivity and identification protection in quantitative probabilistic manner.
The third assumption implies that the set ∆ may be specified in several ways. Recall that
the risk minimization framework is based on the assumption that there is a tradeoff in
disclosing private information. On one hand the disclosed data incurs a privacy loss and
on the other hand disclosing data serves some benefit. The risk minimization framework
argminδ∈∆ R(δ, θ) assumes that ∆ contains a set of rules acceptable in terms of their dis-
closure benefit, and from which we select the one incurring the least risk. k-Anonymity
ignores this tradeoff and the set of candidate rules ∆ may be specified in several ways, for
example ∆ = ∆0 ∪ {δ∗k} where ∆0 contains rules that violate the k-anonymity constraints.
6 Privacy Risk and Record Linkage
We have thus far discussed the usage of a dictionary to identify the entity associated with
a disclosed record. The re-identification process can be whether an exact linkage or an ap-
proximate linkage. The latter type of linkage is better known as record linkage [9]. Though
we have not explicitly mentioned record linkage, our framework does include the possibil-
ity of performing linkage in both ways.
However, in this section we provide some further considerations that are intended to ex-
tend our framework to also consider additional information that the attacker may have as a
consequence of the linkage. Indeed, the linkage, if successful, enlarges the available infor-
mation thereby influencing both the data sensitivity and subsequent identification proba-
bility. The probabilistic framework of the privacy risk can be naturally extended to account
for such cases. Figure 1 illustrates the linkage process in the context of the privacy risk
framework.
We say that the linkage of the disclosed data δ(x) and public record z is successful if
δ(x) and z are records that relate to the same entity. The linkage of δ(xi) and z creates
an enlarged set of attributes δ(xi) ∨ z combining information from both sources, which if
successful, improves identification based on a dictionary.
The disclosed record y = δ(x) and the linked record z are random variables with a joint
distribution p(x, z) = p(x)p(z|y) where p(x) may be the empirical p̃(x) described earlier
and the conditional p(z|y) is the probability of linking record z with record y. In this case,
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it is important to estimate the linking probability based on what a sensible attacker might
do. In the case of linking δ(xi) ∨ z, the risk is
Rlink(δ, θ) = Ep(x)p(z|x)(ℓ(δ(x) ∨ z, θ))
where the loss function ℓ(δ(xi) ∨ z) can be structured in a similar way to our previous
discussion. The expectation in the definition of Rlink is with respect to a joint distribution
over x, y defined by p(x, z) = p(x)p(z|x) as described above. Introducing a binary random
variable W representing successful linking we have that the loss incurred under successful
linking and identification is equal to the sensitivity of the enlarged data Φ(δ(x) ∨ z, θ) is
ℓ(δ(x) ∨ z, θ) provided that {W = 1, Z = 1}. Continuing as before, we can define the loss
ℓ(δ(x) ∨ z, θ) as the expectation of the sensitivity taking into consideration probabilities of
successful linking and identification.
7 Applications and Experiments
In this section, we define two operators that implement disclosure rules on relations (Sec-
tion 7.1), and then proceed to illustrate some experiments further validating our framework
(Section 7.2). The following section contains experiments outlining a particular case study.
7.1 Implementation of Disclosure Rules
As described in Section 3.4, disclosure rules can lead to data generalization or even to data
suppression. In this section we describe two operators that implement disclosure rules in
a relational setting. In particular, we show that we can define such operators by relying on
relational algebra, thus enabling the usage of relational technology. The definition in rela-
tional algebra allows us to prove some interesting properties as well as to obtain consistent
advantages in terms of standardization and efficiency of the disclosure rules implementa-
tion. More specifically, the algebraic specification of the operators paves the way for the
realization of optimization strategies within relational technology.
As previously mentioned, we consider the relation T (A1, . . . , Am) and the set X = Dom1×
· · · × Domm with the attribute A1 representing a record identifier. We further assume that
F is a formula involving: (i) a set of operands that are either variables or constants, (ii) the
set of arithmetic operators {=, 6=, <,≤, >,≥}, and (iii) the set of logical operators {∨,∧,¬}.
Such formulas are used to specify disclosure conditions, i.e. to identify the tuples of a
relation which are subject to privacy constraints and on which disclosure rules must be
enforced. We first define the operator hideT that enables attribute-level suppression on the
table T .
Definition 6. Given an attribute Aj of the relation T , and a formula F, the operator hideT
is defined as
hideT (Aj , F ) = (Π〈A1,Aj〉σF T ) ⊲⊳=A1 T
First, the operator selects the tuples satisfying the condition F in the relation T . The selec-
tion σF specifies which tuples do not have privacy requirements on the attribute Aj . Sec-
ond, the projection Π〈A1,Aj〉 builds a partial result used to recompose the original relation,
with ⊥ values replacing the values of Aj to be kept private. For this latter step, the right
outer join operator ⊲⊳= is applied over the record identifier A1, and is used to introduce the
⊥ values wherever specified by the disclosure conditions. Note that the outer join operator
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A1 A2 A3 A4
1 a1 b1 c1
2 a2 b2 c2




The starting relation T T∗ = Π〈A1,A2〉σA1 6=1∧A1 6=3T
⇓
A1 A2 A3 A4
1 ⊥ b1 c1
2 a2 b2 c2
3 ⊥ b3 c3
The target relation T ′ = T∗ ⊲⊳=A1 T
Figure 5: The hideT (A2, F
′ ∧ F ′′) operator
is used in cases when it is required that the resulting relation contains all tuples from both
relations, even if they do not participate in the join. In such cases they are padded with ⊥
values [17].
The following proposition formally states the commutative and associative properties of
the operator, that are directly derived from properties of relational algebra.
Proposition 3. The operator hideT is commutative and associative with respect to disclo-
sure conditions. Given two disclosure conditions F ′ and F ′′ with respect to the T -attribute
Aj , and a disclosure condition F
′′′ with respect to the T -attribute Ah:
• hidehideT (Aj ,F ′)(Ah, F
′′′) = hidehideT (Ah,F ′′′)(Aj , F
′);
• hidehideT (Aj ,F ′)(Aj , F
′′) = hideT (Aj , F
′ ∧ F ′′).
The commutative property is particularly relevant as it means that the order according to
which disclosure rules are enforced on the original relation is not significant.
In the following, we provide an example of how the hideT operator is applied in order to
enforce suppression disclosure rules. Suppose that we want to enforce the rules: (i) “For
tuple 1, the attribute value a1 of A2 is private” and (ii) “For tuple 3, the attribute value a3
of A2 is private” on the relation T shown in Figure 5. Two disclosure conditions F
′ and F ′′
are formulated as (A1 6= 1) and (A1 6= 3), respectively. Notice that the disclosure condi-
tions are formulated such that they exclude the tuples requiring privacy enforcement on a
specific attribute from the partial result. Due to the associativity property of the disclosure
conditions, we can apply the operator hideT (A2, F
′ ∧ F ′′) according to the steps shown in
Figure 5, thus obtaining the resulting relation T ′.
We next define the operator genT that implements the generalization disclosure rules on
a table T .
Definition 7. Given an attribute Aj of the relation T , a formula F , and a table GF (A1, Âj)
that contains the generalization values for Aj . Such values are supposed to have been
chosen from the domain generalization hierarchy of Aj corresponding to tuples selected
by F , i.e., tuples affected by privacy constraints. The operator genT is defined as follows:
genT (Aj , F ) = ρAj/ bAj (Π〈A1,...,Aj ,..., bAj〉−〈Aj〉(T ⊲⊳A1 GF ))
Notice that the relational algebra operator ρAj/ bAj is used for renaming Âj as Aj . In Fig-
ure 6, we provide an example of how the genT operator is applied in order to enforce
generalization disclosure rules. We modify the example shown in Figure 5 such that the
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A1 A2 A3 A4
1 a1 b1 c1
2 a2 b2 c2





The starting relation T The generalized relation GF
⇓
A1 A2 A3 A4 bA2
1 a1 b1 c1 â1
2 a2 b2 c2 a2
3 a3 b3 c3 â3
T∗ = T ⊲⊳A1 GF
⇓
A1 A2 A3 A4
1 â1 b1 c1
2 a2 b2 c2
3 â3 b3 c3







Figure 6: The genT (A2, F
′ ∧ F ′′) operator
rules are: (i) “For tuple 1, the attribute value a1 of A2 is to be released as â1” and (ii) “For
tuple 3, the attribute value a3 of A2 is to be released as â3”. The two disclosure conditions
F ′ and F ′′ do not change and are (A1 6= 1) and (A1 6= 3), respectively. We apply the opera-
tor genT (A2, F
′∧F ′′) according to the steps shown in Figure 6, thus obtaining the resulting
relation T ′. The generalized relation GF is supposed to contain generalized values for A2
in correspondence to tuples selected by F ′ and F ′′. The (i) join of T and GF , (ii) projection
on all attribute except A2, and (iii) renaming of Â2 as A2 are performed in this order to
obtain the disclosed table T ′.
Finally, we notice the following properties of the genT operator:
• It is easy to verify that the commutative and associative properties proved for the
hideT operator are also valid for the genT operator.
• Suppression as a special case of generalization is coherent with the semantics spec-
ified for the genT operator. Indeed, if the table GF includes ⊥ symbols, then such
symbols will be released.
7.2 Experiments
The goals of our experiments are three-fold: (i) to validate the risk associated with different
dictionaries, (ii) to assess the impact of different parameters on the privacy risk, and (iii) to
use the proposed framework to assess the relationship between the estimated risk and the
true risk.
We conducted our experiments on a real database obtained from Wal-Mart. The database
represents an item description table of more than 400,000 records each with more than
70 attributes. Part of the table is used to represent the disclosed data whereas the whole
table is used to generate a different dictionary. Throughout all our experiments, the risk
components are computed as follows. First, the identification risk is computed with the aid
of the Jaro distance function [10] that is used to identify dictionary items consistent with a
released record to a certain extent (we used 80% similarity threshold to imply consistency.)
Second, the sensitivity of the disclosed data is assessed by means of random weights that
are generated using a uniform random number generator. These random weights could be,
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|θtrue| = |θ̂| |θtrue| = 2|θ̂|
(c)
Figure 7: (a) The risk associated with different dictionaries and c values, (b) a comparison
between our decision theory framework and k-anonymity, and (c) the relationship between
the true risk and the estimated risk.
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without loss of generality, replaced with more realistic values if the organization to which
data belongs provides such an information.
We use a simplified utility function u(y) to capture the information benefit of releasing a
record y: Data usefulness is intuitively measured by how far it is from the root. The farther
the node is from the root, the more specific it is, and the more information it provides. Roots
carry no information whereas leaves carry the most useful information. For simplicity, the
distance of each node from the root is equivalently computed by subtracting the height of





where Dist(RootDGHi , yi) represents the sum of all heights in the domain generalization
hierarchies or DGH (see Figure 8) minus the number of generalization steps that were per-
formed to obtain the record y. For each record xi, the minimum risk is obtained subject to
the constraint set ∆̂ = {δ : ∀i u(δ(xi)) ≥ c}. The impacts of the parameter c and the dic-
tionary size on the privacy risk are reported in Figure 7(a). As c increases from 0 to 10 (i.e.,
more specific data is being disclosed) and by fixing the dictionary size the identification
probability, as well as the privacy risk increase.
On the other hand, fixing c at a certain value c = 8, the relation between the risk and dic-
tionary size is inversely related. As the attacker’s dictionary size increases, more consistent
records are found reducing the identification probability. The different dictionaries were
generated from the original table with sizes varying from 10% to 100% of the size of the
whole table. Interestingly, the experimental data shows that the multiplicative sensitivity
model is always superior to the additive model. The superiority of multiplicative model
over the additive model comes from the observation that the former always yields a higher
modeled risk. A conservative user would always be more alarmed if this model is used.
We compare the risk and utility associated with a disclosed table based on our decision
theory framework and arbitrary k-anonymity rules for k from 0 to 100. In Figure 7(b)
we compare the utility and risk of optimally selected disclosure policies and standard k-
anonymity rules (averaged over a random selection of 10 k-anonymity rules). The optimal
disclosure policies consistently outperform standard k-anonymity rules. The arrows in
the figure represent the difference in risk between both approaches which increases as k
increases.
The relationship between the true risk R(δ, θtrue) and the estimated risk R(δ, θ̂) is illus-
trated in the scatter plot in Figure 7(c). All the points occur above the line y = x which
agrees with out result of upper bounding the R(δ, θtrue) by R(δ, θ̂). Note that as the size
of the true dictionary becomes significantly larger than the size of the estimated dictionary,
the points seem to trace a steeper line which means that the estimated risk becomes a looser
upper bound on the true risk.
8 Case Study: An Organization Releasing Customers’ Data
We demonstrate the practical applicability of the privacy risk framework in this section
by describing its application to customer databases of commercial organizations. In such
cases, the organizations often benefit from disclosing customer records, for example due to
outsourcing its datamining efforts or otherwise sharing customer records with partnering
organizations. The initial customer suspicion towards sharing their records, is often relaxed
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{ [x, x+40k]: wS/40 } 
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{ [x, x+80k] : wS/80 } 
{ Salary ($k) : wS } 
{ [x, x+20k] : wS/20 } 
(d) Income
Figure 8: Domain Generalization Hierarchies (DGHs) with the Associated Sensitivity
Weights
by offering them benefits such as loyalty cards or some other discount plans in return for
their participation.
Willing participants may rate the privacy of various parts of their data as non-private,
semi-private and very-private. For example, consider a customer database such as Ama-
zon.com where some of the customer transactions are non-private, some are semi-private,
and some are very private (for example a purchase disclosing a health condition or an em-
barrassing area of interest). The organization will treat the transactions according to the
user specified sensitivity which will in turn constitute a user specified loss function. To
prevent customers from registering all transactions as very-private the organization may
enforce constraints on the supplied loss, which must be obeyed in order to participate in
the discount plan. It is the organizations’ responsibility to determine at which level of gen-
eralization hierarchy each attribute is to be disclosed such that: (i) minimizing the inherited
risk associated with violating customers’ privacy (e.g., the potential law suit resulting from
releasing very-private information) and (ii) maximizing (or at least establishing a floor for)
the benefit of the released information. Note that in this example, the utility of disclos-
ing data may be quantified by the monetary amount the organization can expect to obtain,
for example by selling the data or by projected increase in efficiency due to data mining
activity.
An illustrative scenario is described as follows. Suppose that Wal-mart needs to assess
the risk associated with releasing its members’ data while maximizing its benefit. To carry
out our experiments, a projected Wal-mart members table of 5, 667, 004 records is used.
The projection contains 4 attributes: City, Race, Birthdate, and Household Income.
Figure 8 depicts the used domain generalization hierarchies for these 4 attributes with the
associated sensitivity weights computed as follows.
First of all, we assume, without loss of generality, that all leaf nodes belonging to the same
DGH are equally sensitive. We use a modified harmonic mean1 to compute the sensitivity
of a parent node wp with l immediate children given the sensitivities of these children
1Different means may lead to alternative ways to define the sensitivity function. For the sake of experimenta-
tion, we elect to use one of these means.
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with the exception that the root node (corresponding to suppressed data) has a sensitivity
weight of 0. Clearly, the modified harmonic mean satisfies the following properties: (i) the
sensitivity of any node is greater than or equal 0 provided that the sensitivity of all leaves
are greater than or equal 0, (ii) the sensitivity of a parent node is always less than or equal
(in case of 1 child) the sensitivity of any of its descendent nodes, and (iii) the higher the
number of children a node has the lower the sensitivity of this node. For example, given






= wclj , where lj is the number of cities in the county j. Moreover, the sensitivity






= wcn , where m is the
number of counties in the state and n =
∑
1≤j≤m lj is the number of cities in the state.
The multiplicative form Φ4(y) of the sensitivity function is used to compute the over-
all sensitivity of a released record. The weights wc, wr, wb, and ws are set at the values
0.3, 0.4, 0.5, and 0.75, respectively. Therefore, the sensitivity associated with the record
(West Lafayette, White, 05/10/1975, $52k), for example, is e0.3+0.4+0.5+0.75 =
7.03, whereas the sensitivity associated with the record (West Lafayette, ⊥, May





As a dictionary θ we use the Adult database2 which is comprised of 9, 857, 623 records ex-
tracted from US Census data. The database contains 5 attributes: Age, Gender, Zipcode,
Race, and Education. Each record y (and its generalizations) from Wal-mart members
table is matched with this dictionary to identify the number of dictionary records consistent
with it ρ(δ(y)). The matching process is performed on the corresponding attributes repre-
senting age, race, and address in both tables. For example, the record (West Lafayette,
White, 05/10/1975, $52k) has 7 dictionary records consistent with it, whereas the
record(West Lafayette, ⊥, May 1975, [$20k,$99k])has 198 dictionary records
consistent with it.
The loss function associated with releasing a record y is ℓ(y, θ) = Φ(y)|ρ(y,θ)| . For example,
from the above results, the loss associated with releasing the record (West Lafayette,
White, 05/10/1975, $52k) is 7.03/7 = 1.004, whereas the loss associated with re-
leasing the record (West Lafayette, ⊥, May 1975, [$20k,$99k]) is 1.38/198 =
0.007. The overall risk associated with releasing a whole table is computed as the average
loss associated with releasing its individual records.
We use the same utility function explained in Section 7.2. For example, the utility func-
tion corresponding to the record (West Lafayette, White, 05/10/1975, $52k)
is 4 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 13 or equivalently (4 + 2 + 3 + 4) − (0) = 13, whereas the utility func-
tion corresponding to the record (West Lafayette, ⊥, May 1975, [$20k,$99k])
is 4 + 0 + 2 + 1 = 7 or equivalently (4 + 2 + 3 + 4) − (0 + 2 + 1 + 3) = 7.
By following the procedure explained above, the organization goal to determine the dis-
closure rule that yields the minimal risk while maintaining the utility above a certain
threshold is achievable. For each potentially disclosed table T , our model can be applied
to assess both the risk and utility associated with releasing this table. As the case with the
risk, the utility of a given table is the average utility of all individual records constituting
this table rounded to the nearest integer. The table that poses the minimal risk with an
acceptable utility is released.
2Downloaded from http://www.ipums.org
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(c) Risk and Utility Scatter Plot
Figure 9: Risks and Utilities for Different Disclosure Rules



















(b) Maximizing the Utility
Figure 10: The Optimal Disclosure Rule
TRANSACTIONS ON DATA PRIVACY 2 (2009)
A Decision Theoretic Framework for Assessing Privacy Risk 177

















































































Figure 11: Effect of Utility Threshold on the Level of Attribute Disclosure
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Figure 12: The Discrete Optimization Algorithm
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Figure 9 shows some plots of the risks and associated utilities for various disclosure rules.
Recall that a disclosure rule δi(T ) (or simply δi) is a combination of transformations (sup-
pression, generalization, and disclosure of actual data) performed on the attributes of the
original table T which results in the disclosed table T ′3. Figures 9(a)(b) plot the computed
risks (in increasing order) and the corresponding utilities for random instances of the re-








, i = 1, 2, · · · }, respec-
tively. As expected the utility increases as the risk increases. However, sometimes this is
not the case due to the settings of the sensitivity weights and the topologies of different
DGHs. The scatter plot in Figure 9(c) depicts the high positive correlations between risk
and utility with a computed correlation coefficient of 0.858.
Had the organization goal been focusing only on one factor (i.e., minimize the risk or
maximize the utility), these 2 curves would have been sufficient to identify the optimal
disclosure rule. However, it is often the case that the goal is to optimize one of the factors
while maintaining an acceptable level of the other factor. Figure 10 shows how the optimal
disclosure rule is determined for the example at hand. By using different values for the
constant c and obtaining the minimum risk, Figure 10(a) can be plotted. It shows the opti-
mal risk (and accordingly the optimal disclosure rule) that yields utility U ≥ c. Specifically,
it helps determine δ∗ = argminδ R(δ) subject to U(δ) ≥ c. Likewise, by fixing the risk at dif-
ferent values for the constant c and obtaining the maximum utility, we obtain Figure 10(b)
which shows that the optimal utility (and accordingly the optimal disclosure rule) poses a
risk R ≤ c. Specifically, it helps determine δ∗ = argmaxδ U(δ) subject to R(δ) ≤ c.
We implemented a heuristic discrete optimization algorithm, Branch and Bound [12], to
obtain the heuristic optimum disclosure rule. Figure 12 shows that the discrete optimiza-
tion algorithm is superior in terms of execution time compared to the brute-force algorithm
with no significant risk increase.
Figure 11 shows some statistics about the frequencies of generalization steps carried out
on each attribute at different utility levels to obtain the optimal risk. For instance, when
setting the utility U ≥ 5, Figure 11(d) indicates that the actual salaries of almost all mem-
bers are released. Clearly, the tendency towards releasing the actual data increases as the
utility level increases. Moreover, depending on attribute settings, the level of aggressive-
ness with which the tendency to release the actual data occurs varies. The statistics shows,
for instance, that most of the time the actual birthdate is released when the required utility
U ≥ 3. An organization that is willing to apply the disclosure rule which has been applied
the most may elect to release the actual birthdate for a newly added record when the utility
is sought to be no less than 3.
9 Related Work
The task of avoiding privacy violations has been investigated by different communities.
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, our approach is the first in providing a com-
prehensive theoretical framework for assessing privacy risks. Our framework, published
initially in [13], is based on statistical decision theory and is a highly flexible tool for mod-
eling the trade-off between disclosure benefits and risks. It incorporates into a probabilistic
framework the notion of personalized data sensitivity, identification model and attacker’s
side information. The connection between personalized privacy preservation and decision
theory may lead to further theoretical insights and practical techniques.
3An example of T ′ is {(West Lafayette,White,05/10/1975,$52k), (Indiana,Asian,1948,⊥),
(⊥,Chinese,August 1965,[$20k,$40k]), · · · }.
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Section 5 relates the privacy risk framework to k-anonymity and includes a discussion
of related work in that context. We describe here additional related work in the statisti-
cal databases and data mining literatures. In statistical databases, queries result in some
statistical information, for example the average of a set of values. The techniques for pre-
serving privacy can be divided into two categories: (i) query restriction and (ii) input-
output perturbation. Query restriction methods pose limitations on query parameters
while input-output perturbations alter the data by introducing noise to either the data or
the query results. Unlike statistical databases that are concerned with disclosing statistical
data summaries, our framework focuses on disclosing elementary data and thus incorpo-
rates a broader class of queries. Moreover, while recent proposals in statistical database
[4, 2] focus on the tradeoff between meaningfulness of information and privacy loss, we
are interested in the fundamentally different tradeoff between disclosure benefit and pri-
vacy loss. In the data mining area, several approaches have been developed for privacy
preserving data mining. Unlike our framework, such approaches (e.g., [8]) are based on
perturbing the original data and at the same time achieving correct data mining results.
Duncan et al. [6] describes a framework, called Risk-Utility (R-U) confidentiality map,
which addresses the tradeoff between data utility and disclosure. [11] propose an approach
to risk analysis for disclosed anonymized data based on modeling a database as a series of
transactions and the attacker’s knowledge as a belief function. Our model is fundamen-
tally different since we deal exactly with relational instances rather than data frequencies,
we do not consider simply anonymized data and we incorporate the concept of data sensi-
tivity into our framework. [16] provide a measure of the privacy risk in the context of the
query-view security problem but such measure does not result in a complete framework
for privacy risk assessment.
Another decision theory based approach to privacy measurement was proposed by Trot-
tini and Fienberg [22], [23]. In that approach the risk is based on the deviation of the pos-
terior from the prior. Despite the fact that both [22], [23] and our approach are based on
decision theory, there are some fundamental differences. In our approach the risk is based
on a user defined sensitivity function which enables personalization without the need for
specifying a prior distribution and computing a posterior distribution. We also introduce
both a utility and loss function which take complementary roles (but neither is determined
by the other). The state of nature θ now denotes the attacker’s knowledge as opposed to a
parameter governing the data generation process.
These differences reflect the somewhat non-classical approach to decision theory taken
in this paper. The role of θ, the use of the empirical distribution in definition of the risk,
and the complementary roles of the utility and loss function are somewhat different than
traditional decision theory settings. Nevertheless, we believe that our setting is more ap-
propriate to our problem, which is measuring personalized utility and risk associated with
disclosing private information.
10 Discussion
In this paper we describe a novel framework for quantitatively assessing and optimizing
privacy risk in a variety of situations. Our framework combines both the identification
and data sensitivity components with the latter being a personalized subjective measure.
This framework substantially differs from the recent alternatives proposed in the literature
which usually neglect the role of data sensitivity. Moreover, only little of the recent work
are based on a probabilistic identification model [5, 28].
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The quantitative framework allows defining and computing optimal disclosure policies,
where optimality is defined in a number of alternative ways. The computation and opti-
mization of the risk are described in the context of exact knowledge, partial knowledge, and
no knowledge whatsoever with respect to the attacker’s side information. While comput-
ing the optimal policy may require massive computation for large datasets, we demonstrate
a discrete approximation method based on branch and bound that closely approximates the
optimal policy while being computationally efficient.
We demonstrate the generality of our framework by showing that k-anonymity is a spe-
cial case of it and we have highlighted the decision theory based assumptions underlying
k-anonymity. Viewed in this perspective, the various often implicit assumptions underly-
ing k-anonymity become explicit allowing their more rigorous examination and possible
generalization.
Our framework makes the following basic assumptions.
• Subjective sensitivity information is available at the attribute level. In the case that
personalized or subjective sensitivity information is not available, default values pro-
vided by the database designer may be used instead.
• Loss is defined by measuring separately the sensitivity of the disclosed data under
successful and unsuccessful identification.
• Risk is defined as expected or average loss. Different loss aggregations such as worst-
case may be incorporated into the framework as necessary.
• Preventing privacy violations is achieved by data suppression and generalization
with the particular choice of suppression or generalization possibly revealing infor-
mation concerning the original data. This ‘second order’ effect is ignored in the cur-
rent presentation for simplicity purposes.
• The adversarial external knowledge is given in terms of a side information referred
to as a dictionary. We provide a variety of ways to compute or bound the risk in
situations where the dictionary is completely known, partially known, or unknown.
In practice, some situations may require slightly altering the assumptions above. How-
ever, we believe our framework to be rather general and easily modified to account for
many practical cases. While it may seem that our framework makes substantially more as-
sumptions than alternative models, we point out that we simply make these assumptions
explicitly rather than implicitly, as is the case for example with k-anonymity. In order to
make any meaningful claim concerning privacy preservation, some assumptions have to
be made concerning the resources that are available to the attacker and the sensitivity of
the data. Making these assumptions explicitly rather than implicitly, allows an open dis-
cussion of their strengths and weaknesses and suggests different adaptations depending
on the situation at hand.
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